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equity is found 1 2 There are a few testamentary causes including one
where lands as well as chattels were distributed,' 3 but most routine mat-
ters relating to wills, administrations, and guardianships probably never
came before the court and were handled by the clerk who served also as
register.' 4 There are various administrative proceedings relative to such
things as roads, ordinaries, and the indenting of servants. Indeed the
record shows even legislation by the commissioners or justices who were
the law-makers before the assembly was established. A law in 168o for-
bidding the sale of rum to Indians was modified later in the same year so
as merely to enjoin that those selling to Indians should take care that they
speedily depart into the woods to drink the liquor so that people might
not be disturbed by them.'5 Thus did the Quaker ideal of decorum com-
promise with the Quaker instinct for trade.
The editors are to be congratulated'upon their work of transcribing the
two volumes of manuscript into readable form and still preserving the
atmosphere of the time. There are a few identification notes to the body
of the records and also other footnotes to indicate spelling discrepancies
and changes of handwriting. A single index includes names of persons
and places along with subject-matter. A map of West Jersey would have
added to the usefulness of the book. There is an excellent historical in-
troduction which treats legal matters to some extent but regrettably the
legal introduction was not ready in time for publication. It is earnestly
hoped that someone will do for this volume what Professor Chafee did
along this line in his introduction to the Records of the Suffolk County
Courts 16 and in his lengthy review 17 of Boorstin's Delaware Cases.
THomSAs E. ATKINSON.*
WHEATON'S INTERNAT NOAL LAW. Volume two. Seventh English edi-
tion by A. Berriedale Keith.' London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1944.
Pp. xxvii, 672. 5o/.
Wheaton's classic Elements of International Law first appeared in
1836, and the famous author made the final changes in 1847. The last
American edition was the celebrated one of Dana, called the eighth, un-
less we except the combined edition of the Elements and Wheaton's His-
12 P. 102 (specific performance tried by the court) ; p. 110; p. 124 (defense of
drunkenness in common law action on bond); pp. i8o-Si ("appeal to equity"
allowed).
13 P. 162.
14 Pp. xxxix, i, n.z, 151.
15 Pp. 2, 3. However, Learning and Spicer and subsequent entries in the volume
under review show that the absolute prohibition was later restored.
16 (1933).
17 (1944) 57 HARv. L. REV. 399.
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1 Of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.
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tory of International Law, published by W. B. Lawrence in 1868-8o in
four volumes. In 1878 the English took up the Elements. Boyd's three
editions preserved Wheaton's original text, and this was done for the
last time in the fourth edition by Atlay in 1904. By reason of the Hague
Conventions and the many changes effected in the law and in practice
since 1841, Coleman Philipson, the editor of the fifth English edition,
1916, merged Wheaton's text with his own comments and characterized
himself properly as co-author. Wheaton's text is even less distinguish-
able in the two editions (the sixth and seventh), published in 1929 and
1944, by the present editor, Professor Keith, a scholar more especially
known for his contributions to English constitutional law. Volume two,
which alone is under review, is an exceedingly voluminous work, since it
lays under contribution the cumulative efforts of past editors.
The work is a valuable commentary on the laws of land and maritime
warfare, as built through three centuries of experience. Yet Mr. Keith
labored under several handicaps: (i) He was writing in time of war, and
could not fully detach his conclusions from the emotions of the times.
(2) He is a British subject, and doubtless felt it incumbent upon himself
to defend the Orders in Council and reprisals of his own government in
the war of 1914, although he admits and proves that" All wars, and most
notably that of 1914-i9, have seen wholesale violations of the customary
and conventional rules of warfare." 2 (3) He writes as if the League
Covenant were still in force, presenting the" changes effected in the law
of nations by Articles 16 and others, and yet presenting also the law of
nations as it prevailed down to i919. It is hard to tell whether he con-
siders one or both or neither to be in effect, since he also seems to ap-
prove the idea that the League of Nations has abolished both the freedom
of the seas and the status of neutrality.3 The fact that there are now
numerous neutrals, and that as late as 1911 another Englishman, Sir
Thomas Barclay, pronounced "Neutrality . . . the most progressive
branch of modern International Law," may account for the space de-
voted to the subject of neutrality. Nevertheless, Mr. Keith's belief that
the distinction between combatants and noncombatants (which he calls
"illusory and immoral ") had been or should be ab6lished,4 seems hardly
compatible with the doctrine of conditional contraband discussed at
length 5 or with the doctrine that neutrals have the right to live, if not
to trade, other than by consent of the belligerents. He condemns retalia-
tory measures if too harsh on neutrals,6 but accepts as sound the view
of the British'prize courts in the Stigstad, 7 and the Leonora," of the Or-
ders in Council of i15 and 1917, requiring neutrals engaged in inter-
neutral trade to call at British ports, that it was for the belligerent to
judge of the harshness of his own measures, and that the burdens im-
2 P. 582. 6 p. 553.
8 See p. 558. 7 [19i9] A. C. 279.
4 P. 17I. 8 [xg9i] A. C. 974.
5 P. 488.
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posed on neutrals were bearable. These cases were too much for a dis-
tinguished English authority on international law, Professor Brierly, who
thought they represented the " vanishing point " of law in regulating the
relations between belligerents and neutrals.9 If they are justified as re-
prisal orders, "anything may serve as an excuse for reprisals." 10 Mr.
Keith explains the payment made by the Foreign Office in the case of the
Kim, in which Sir Samuel Evans could see no distinction between goods
absolutely and conditionally contraband, as" in pursuance of the policy
of securing neutrals from needless loss." 11 It would have been well to
accept England's proposal of 1907 to abolish the conception of contra-
band. Professor Keith's view that "a blockade being thus an infringe-
ment of neutral rights, its operation is not to be extended further than
the actual circumstances of the case render it necessary," 12 seems to
him not inconsistent with his approval of the "long-distance blockade,"
protested by the United States, and Asquith's famous remark that "We
are not going to allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of juridical
niceties." 13 Mr. Keith seems to approve the unprecedented belligerent
expansion of contraband lists, which reduced the Declaration of Paris of
1856 to meaninglessness. Either the so-called "blockade" or " contra-
band" sufficed to prohibit enemy trade,14 a prohibition which seem-
ingly has become the aim of large belligerents, when neutrals are unable
to defend the law.15 It is not adequately observed, as a perusal of Story
will show, that prize procedure lost its whole legal function when Orders
in Council changed the rules of evidence and the State compelled devia-
tion and detention to permit examination in, port and condemnation by
statistics and collateral testimony.16
Mr. Keith's devotion to the law, even the more unstable and insecure
public law, is or may be impaired by his political allegiance. Although
it is inferable that he condemns the confiscation of enemy private prop-
erty, he is rather vague and misleading as to what happened under Arti-
cle 297 of the Treaty of Versailles, which witnessed wholesale confisca-
tions and rendered precarious the whole institution of foreign investment.
If national claims justified the confiscation of private property,'7 there
never would have been any sanctity to private property. He considers
"defensively armed" merchant vessels free from unwarned attack by
9 See Brierly, International Law in England (i935) 51 L. Q. REv. 26.
10 P. 586.
11 P. 597.12 P. 529.
13 p. 556. Mr. Asquith is misquoted by Mr. Keith.
14 P. 490.
15 Modern extension of the blacklists and the recommendations of Article 7 oL
the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control of
1942, by which neutrals may be crippled and disfavored businesses wound up and
confiscated, are ominous. The effects of economic warfare are not calculated to
produce postwar tranquility.
16 Pp. 599, 604.
17 P. 12X.
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submarines,"' and would abolish the submarine as a commerce de-
stroyer; '9 yet he seems unaware of the attack on the alleged distinction
between "offensive" and " defensive" armament as to submarines -
quite apart from Admiralty orders - the views expressed by Secretary
Lansing in his note of January i8, 1916, and the current practice of sink-
ing Japanese merchantmen by submarine and airplane on sight and with
little regard for the lives involved. He is bitter in his denunciation of
the way Holland allegedly abused its neutrality- " misdeeds," he calls
it.20 He resents the exclusion of armed British ships (except as war-
ships) by that country in 1915. But Holland was astutely advised by
the late Professor Struycken, one of the ablest of international lawyers,
and the Havana Convention of 1928 on maritime neutrality seems to
have approved the Dutch view. Holland's observance of its neutral
duties seems to have been correct, as does that of Sweden, also adversely
criticized.
The legal events of the war beginning 1939 seem to have received only
perfunctory attention. The traditional view is generally taken. But in
a new edition the following minor matters might be noticed: In the dis-
cussion of spies, espionage and saboteurs, Ex parte Quirin,2'1 might be in-
cluded. The Bryan treaties really could deal only with disputed ques-
tions of fact, a rare occurrence.22 Wasn't the League's function "to
preserve peace" inevitably identified with the preservation of the status
quo? 23 " Sanctions" provoke hostility, war, and intervention, and are
hardly constructive.24 Isn't the work of the Hague Codification Confer-
ence of 1930 underestimated? 25 What is the distinction between an
"aggressive " war and your opponent's war? 26 Baty's distinction be-
tween reprisals and acts of war merits consideration." The mistaken
current view of what was meant by "just war" might be amplified.
Marshall's view on private property in Brown v. United States 28 was
only an intermediate view.2 9 On private property, Hamilton's views on
Article X of the Jay Treaty, expressed in his Camillus Letters, 0 war-
rant consideration. Other topics deserving of more than passing notice
are: the treatment of patents by the Alien Property Custodian, the
"blacklists," the First War Powers Act (194) and the term " foreign
nationals," the nationality of claims,"' the ship's flag as the national pro-
18 P. 271.
9 pP. 345, 578.
20 p. 376 and passim.
21 317 U. S. 1 (1942).
22 See p. 51.
23 See p. 63.
24 See p. 65.
25 See p. 67.
26 See p. 98.
27 See p. 94.
28 8 Cranch io (U. S. 1814).
29 See Moore, John Marshall (i9o) 16 POL. Sc. Q. 393.
so Quoted in MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOz- CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924)
5-32.
31 See p. 46.
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tection of passengers and their assumption of the risk of the flag, the
meaning of "consequences to which an enemy vessel is exposed," as
recorded in Article 56 of the Declaration of London, and its construction
in the Dada case,3 2 the meaning of '" capture " 33 on which some Ameri-
can courts went astray, the dperation of munition factories on neutral
soil, the requisition of refugee merchant ships by the United States, and
the award of the War Claims Arbiter, the decision or award in the case
of the Prometheus, the fundamental change accomplished by the Order
in Council of October 29, 1914, in throwing on the claimant in prize the
burden of proving his innocence, the views of Admiral Consett expressed
in his The Triumph of the Unarmed Forces,'4"whether neutrality can
" disappear" among sovereign states unless world war or no war is to
be humanity's future.3 5
Mr. Keith realizes that in',the contest between the considerations of
humanitarianism and the destructive jmanifestationi of science, science
has won and will probably continue to win. He is discouraged about the
futility of the attempts to improve the law. He therefore concludes that
the only hope .is the abolition of war. That is greatly to be wished. It
may be doubted, however, whether serious progress in that direction has
been made and whether any new Holy Alliance, though the natural out-
come of recent tendencies, can achieve the desired goal.
EDWIN BoRcHARLD *
32 See p. 304. 35 See p. 559.
33 See p. 318. * Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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